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Abstract4
I estimate the causal effects of demand shocks, stemming from government procurement,5
on the growth of small firms in Ecuador. I assemble a unique dataset using several new6
administrative sources and, as identification strategy, exploit a governmental procurement7
process that allocates public contracts through a randomized contest.8
This paper provides three main contributions to the literature. First, it shows the positive9
and significant effect of demand shocks on firm growth. On average, an increase in demand of10
10% will increase wage expenses by 4% and fixed assets by 5% during the year of the shock.11
Second, it finds no evidence of spill-over effects from demand shocks on sales to the public or12
private sector. Finally, as in other studies, it is shown that demand positively impacts firm13
growth but, contrary to other findings, this effect is temporary and only observed during the14
year of the shock.15
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1 Introduction18
Small firms contribute up to 45% of total employment and 33% of GDP in developing countries19
(Kushnir et al., 2010). Despite this, the majority of small firms never grow beyond a few employees20
(Nichter and Goldmark, 2009).1 The importance of firm-growth for economic and political reasons21
is evidenced by the number of policies that have been created to promote it.22
Economic theory provides two different approaches to explain firm growth. On one hand, firms23
can grow due to intrinsic factors such as: managerial ability (Lucas, 1978), increases in produc-24
tivity (Jovanovic, 1982), and experience (Hopenhayn, 1992).2 Public policies meant to address25
intrinsic factors include: access to credit, management development programs, and financial lit-26
eracy programs. On the other hand, a set of recent papers suggest that demand factors, such27
as networking and reputation effects (Fishman and Rob, 2003; Syverson, 2004), might be equally28
important in explaining firm growth. In such cases, public policies that restrict competition and29
favor small enterprises might have a positive and significant impact on the development of small30
and medium enterprises (hereafter SMEs). Argentina’s Ley 25.551 (2001) stipulates that goods31
provided by small firms receive a price margin of 7%; in Brazil, government purchases that are be-32
low a minimum threshold are exclusively destined to small firms (Lei Complementar N 123, 2006).33
This restriction of government procurement processes to certain (by assumption less competitive)34
firms implies that such programs come at a cost. Are these demand-driven programs effective in35
promoting SME growth?36
To empirically evaluate the effects of demand, the researcher needs to isolate it from other37
factors. This is a complicated prospect because the relation between demand and growth is unclear.38
On the one hand, a firm may experience growth due to a shift of the demand curve induced by, for39
example, changes in preferences or exogenous price increases of substitute products. On the other40
hand, a firm that grows may benefit from an increase market exposure and economies of scale,41
leading to an increase in demand. To overcome such identification problems, previous studies have42
relied on firm-level price data that allows to decompose demand and productivity shocks (Foster43
et al., 2008). When such detailed information is not available, researchers impose structure on the44
demand and production functions and obtain estimates of the unobserved demand shocks through45
the regression residuals (Pozzi and Schivardi, 2016). Hebous and Zimmermann (2016) exploit46
1 Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that there are significant differences in productivity between firms, even in
narrowly defined sectors.
2 The empirical evidence corroborates supply-side models. Queiro (2016) presents evidence that managerial
education has a significant effect on firm size while Cabral and Mata (2003) find that experience is an important
factor in determining firm size.
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the timing of public government contracts and estimate that a one dollar increase in government47
purchases increases the capital investment of US firms by 7 to 11 cents. Ferraz et al. (2016),48
whose work is the closest to the present one, use a quasi-experimental design based on the bidding49
process in Brazil. The authors find that winning a contract increases firm growth by 2.2% during50
the quarter of the shock.51
In this study I examine the short- and long-term impacts that demand shocks, stemming from52
government purchases, have on the financial performance of SMEs. For this purpose, I exploit the53
menor cuantia process, a feature in Ecuador’s public procurement law that awards contracts using54
a lottery. Using this as a source of variation in demand, I assemble a unique dataset that combines55
firm level financial information with public purchases records for 1,179 firms that participated56
in the process for the years 2010-2012. I then compare the changes in balance sheet indicators57
between the winners and the losers of the contests, at the extensive and intensive margin.58
I find that demand shocks significantly affect firms’ short-term growth during the year of the59
shock. Firms that won a contract report, on average, 22% higher revenues and current assets,60
and 7% higher fixed assets than firms that did not win. The intensive margin analysis suggests61
that increasing demand by 10% will increase wage expenses by 4% and current assets by 5%. The62
effects of demand shocks are temporary and are only observed during the year of the shock. A63
year after winning a contract, gross revenues and current assets revert back to pre-shock levels64
and there are no differences in wage expenses and fixed assets between winners and runner-ups65
of the contest. Moreover, I find that, outside the menor cuantia process, there are virtually no66
differences in sales to the government or the private sector between winners and losers.67
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the role of demand on firm growth and68
to the nascent literature that examines the role of government expenditure on firm dynamics69
(Hoekman and Sanfilippo, 2018; Czarnitzki et al., 2018). The main contribution of the paper is70
that it highlights that the magnitude, nature, and duration of the shocks are important factors to71
consider when analyzing how demand affects firm growth. Shocks that are perceived as temporary72
or unsustainable seem to only affect short-term measures of growth. An additional contribution73
of this paper is that it provides an evaluation of a governmental preferential purchasing program74
for the particular case of small firms.75
The rest of this paper is divided as follows: section 2 explains the country context and procure-76
ment mechanism. Section 3 introduces the data. Section 4 discusses the identification strategy77
and empirical methodology. Section 5 provides the results and section 6 concludes.78
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2 Background79
2.1 Public procurement in Ecuador80
Ecuador is a small middle-income country with a 2016 population of 16 million people and a per81
capita income of $6,205 (2016). Since the year 2000, the official currency of Ecuador is the U.S.82
Dollar. Prior to the 2006 election, the country experienced political instability, a financial crisis,83
and ubiquitous cases of corruption. After the 2006 election, the new government vowed to restore84
public trust. As part of this plan, it enacted a new constitution, transparency laws and, in 2008,85
the Public Procurement Law (LONSCP, 2008). The LONSCP reformed the procedures for the86
purchase of public goods and introduced provisions to safeguard the participation of SMEs in87
public procurement. The National Public Purchases Agency defines SMEs as a firm that has less88
than 100 employees and has sales lower than 2 million dollars (SERCOP, 2015).89
As part of the reform in public procurement it was dictated that all government institutions90
procure all purchases through an on-line portal called Compraspublicas.3 Before Compraspublicas,91
government procurement was done at a local level, with limited oversight and accountability. More-92
over, the Law stipulated that the process for the procurement of public works under a threshold,93
precisely 0.0007% of the government’s budget, had to be done under the so-called menor cuantia94
(“small amount”) process. This process contains two distinct features that are particularly relevant95
to this study. It is accessible only to SMEs and it grants contracts through a randomized lottery.96
The menor cuantia process functions through the online portal Compraspublicas. The portal97
connects institutions who procure for services and products (hence projects) with firms, mostly98
from the construction sector, that bid for them.99
In order for a firm to bid on a project, it must register in the portal. During this process,100
firms submit their personal and company information including: contact information, degrees and101
certificates, tax ID number, personal and company tax returns, inventory of physical capital, and102
industrial classification of the company. Once registered, firms are able to browse through the103
public contracts available and place their bids.104
From the institution’s side, the first step to procure a new public work is to create an entry105
in Compraspublicas.4 The new project has to include a description of the public work, location,106
budget, timeline, and project-specific requirements. These requirements include: technical and107
professional experience, qualification of employees, previous experience of the firm, educational108
3The site address is www.compraspublicas.gob.ec
4Each project must be approved in the government budgetary process. This process is done during the previous
fiscal year.
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status of managers, technical abilities, machinery, and financial capital.109
After this step, the project enters its first phase: acceptance of bids from firms. There are110
two ways used to notify firms of a new project. First, the system sends automatic notifications to111
providers. It does so through an algorithm that compares the requirements listed in the project112
with the competencies of providers. In addition to contacting providers directly, the system also113
posts the project on the database of the portal. During this stage, all registered providers are able114
to search and browse through the available projects and express their interest.5115
In the second phase of the process, all providers that bid on the project must provide proof116
that they fulfill the requirements specified. They do this by uploading official documentation to117
Compraspublicas. For instance, if the project requires specific machinery, then providers must118
upload the registration and proof of purchase of the equipment. A notable feature of this part of119
the process is that the requirements for each public work are objective and, in some cases, the120
system does not allow the provider to complete this phase if they do not meet the minimum cutoffs.121
Following this phase, a committee from the public institution evaluates all the providers that122
presented a bid. The committee’s responsibility is to identify if each firm meets the minimum123
requirements for the project- thus supplementing the verification process done by the system. To124
illustrate, suppose that a new construction project requires a minimum of 2 years of previous125
experience. An interior design firm could, theoretically, qualify for this process. In this case, it is126
the role of the committee to verify if the experience listed by the firm is relevant. The committee127
does not rank nor provide a numerical qualification of providers; it only determines if they are128
qualified to perform the project. The providers that qualify enter into a pool. In the final phase of129
the process, the system automatically and randomly selects one provider from the list of qualified130
providers. This provider is the winner of the contest and is given the contract for the project.131
The identification strategy in this study relies on the fact that the allocation of the contract132
is random. For a given public contract all providers that qualify to participate in the lottery133
have, on average, comparable characteristics. The impartiality of the procurement process is134
ultimately an empirical question, and is addressed in the empirical section, where it is concluded135
that menor cuantia projects are, indeed, randomly assigned. Moreover, and regardless of any136
empirical considerations, there are two major features of the process that suggest that contracts137
are assigned randomly.138
First, no negotiation between institutions and firms takes place at any stage. The price for a139
given public work is predetermined and, as a result, no preference is given for one bid being more140
5During 2012 additional rules were added to the system that prevented certain providers from submitting bids.
These rules were not in place during the time period used in this study.
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competitive than another. This is evidenced by comparing the budgeted and actual costs for a141
given project. In the menor cuantia process these values always coincide. In public work projects142
of higher amounts, which are allocated using different procedures, one can observe considerable143
variations between the estimated and actual costs. Second, the requirements that are set for each144
contract, while reducing the heterogeneity of firms that qualify, are defined in terms of objective145
criteria and must be verified by legal documents.6146
3 Data147
The data for this study consist of a panel of 1,179 firms that presented bids on a total of 5,475148
public works performed under the menor cuantia process during the period between May 2009149
and December 2012. Firm-level data were obtained from the National Bureau of Companies of150
Ecuador (SUPERCIAS) and include contact information, yearly tax returns, and balance sheet151
information.7 Data of public works performed under the menor cuantia process come from the152
Ecuadorian Procurement Agency and include contract information for each public work, the unique153
identification number of each firm that bid on each project, a list of qualified providers, and the154
winner of the contest.8 At the time of writing, all data for this project were publicly available155
but were not easily accessible. For this reason, the data were obtained by using a web scraping156
algorithm. The appendix provides a comprehensive overview of how the data gathering process.157
158
[Table 1 about here.]159
The breakdown of qualified firms by year is as follows: 146 in 2009, 543 in 2010, 543 in 2011,160
and 546 in 2012. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the firms in the sample. The sample of161
companies in this study consists principally of small and medium sized firms in the construction162
industry. Based on their official registration record, 86% of firms report that their primary special-163
ization is construction of buildings, real estate activities, architecture and engineering consulting,164
6 A potential concern is the discretion the committee has to qualify providers. A committee might try to provide
preferential treatment to a firm by being stringent in their review of other firms and thus limiting the number of
qualified providers. To overcome this potential limitation, I exclude from the sample a firm if, during any contest,
it was the only one qualified into the pool.
7All values are obtained from firms’ balance sheet documents, as reported to the tax authorities (Servicio de
Rentas Internas).
8Firm level data can be found at http://www.supercias.gob.ec. Public works data can be found at
https://www.compraspublicas.gob.ec.
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or civil engineering. The companies were categorized based on their size by SERCOP.9 Medium165
sized companies make up 8% of the sample and have average gross revenues of $943,107. Small166
sized companies make up 44% and have average gross revenues of $244,590. Micro sized companies167
make 48% of the sample and have gross revenues of $84,458. Firms in the sample are young, the168
average age (years since registration) being 5.1 years. 90% of firms in the sample are less than169
13 years old. For the period 2009-2012, each firm qualified to be part in the random drawing an170
average of 5.04 times per year, winning a contract, on average, 0.80 times per year. Financially, the171
firms report to have average total assets of $128,589 and average liabilities of $98,202. The average172
wage expenditure is $25,931 and 90% of firms report wage expenditure of less than $60,000.10 Ge-173
ographically, 55% of the firms in the sample are located in the 10 most populous cities in Ecuador,174
where approximately 50% of the total population live.175
176
[Table 2 about here.]177
Table 2 provides the description of the 5,475 public works used in the study. The average178
contract amount is $50,000 and approximately 70% of contracts are worth less than $60,000.179
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the values of public works for the years 2009-2012. The average180
contract duration (length of time required for a provider to complete the project ) is 64 days and181
90% of contracts last less than 96 days. The average contract has 6 requirements. On average, 17182
providers qualified for the public contest per contract. The data obtained from the procurement183
agency suggests that all but 16 of the 5,475 public works were completed and delivered.11184
[Figure 1 about here.]185
4 Empirical Strategy186
The purpose of this study is to estimate the causal effects of demand shocks on firm growth. To187
capture different areas of growth, I use four different measures: gross revenues, wage expenses and188
9A micro firm has between 1 and 9 employees and gross sales and assets of less than $100,000. A small firm
has between 10 and 49 employees and sales and assets between $100,000 and 1 million dollars. A medium firm has
between 50 and 99 employees and sales between 1 and 2 million dollars.
10A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that 90% of firms have less than 3-7 permanent employees.
11The remaining 16 public works were terminated unilaterally. There is no information that describes the reasons
for the termination. In the robustness section, I exclude those providers that participated in those contests.
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fixed and current assets.12189
Assume that the relationship between firm growth and demand can be represented by the190
following reduced-form model:191
y˙it = β0 + β1dit +Xitβ2 + µi + it (1)
where y˙it denotes the growth of firm i during period t, dit is the demand faced by the firm192
during year t, Xit is a matrix of firm-specific covariates, µi denotes unobserved time-invariant193
firm characteristics, and it is the error term. I define y˙it to be the difference in logs: y˙it =194
ln(yit) − ln(yit−1)∀ y ∈ { gross revenues, wage, and fixed and current assets}.13 Estimating195
this model by ordinary least squares will yield biased results if the demand faced by the firm is196
correlated with unobserved firm characteristics, µi, which is likely the case.197
To eliminate µi, one could transform the model by first differencing it. Even though this trans-198
formation eliminates µi, estimating the differenced model by OLS will provide a biased estimate if199
E[∆it,∆dit] 6= 0, i.e changes in demand are correlated with time-variant unobserved firm charac-200
teristics. To overcome this identification problem, one needs to identify a source of demand that201
is exogenous.202
The increase in demand caused by winning a menor cuantia contests provides the source203
of exogenous variation needed to obtain unbiased estimates. Conditionally on qualifying, the204
random nature of the lottery ensures that the contract allocation is independent of firm specific205
characteristics. The firms that did not win the contract (runner-ups) serve as an appropriate206
counter factual to obtain the effects of demand shocks on growth.207
There are two main concerns with using the contracts allocated under menor cuantia as an208
exogenous source of demand. The first concern is that the lottery may not be random. This209
would occur if companies or the public institutions were able to manipulate the system. The210
second concern is participation. Firms can submit bids for multiple projects on a given year. To211
participate in a lottery, each firm must qualify to enter into the pool. If more productive firms212
qualify to more contests, then the probability of winning under the process increases. In this case,213
even if contracts are allocated using a lottery, they are not exogenous to firm characteristics.214
These concerns can be tested empirically. The probability of winning a contest at time t should215
be orthogonal to any firm level characteristics observed at time t−1. Table 3 shows the results of a216
difference in means two-sample t-test for the firms that qualified for the public contest during 2009-217
12 For revenues I use total sales; for wages I use the total expenditure on salaries, wages, and commissions; for
fixed assets and currents I use the definition as stated in the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
13For robustness, I also use an alternative definition of growth defined as: y˙it =
yit−yit−1
.5(yit−1+yit)
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2012. The difference in means were compared for winners and runner-ups of the contest. There218
are no significant differences between winners and runner-ups. Additional exercises (presented in219
the appendix) compare the theoretical and actual distributions of winners and runner-ups over220
time.14221
[Table 3 about here.]222
In addition to this evidence, the lottery is done through Compraspublicas. This portal is223
constantly audited by external reviewers and neither firms nor institutions have administrative224
access to the site. Finally, the sample in this study excludes a firm if during any contest they won225
because there was only 1 qualified provider in the lottery. All this evidence supports the claim that226
the assignment of contracts is in fact random. For this reason, I estimate the following reduced227
form model:228
y˙it = β0 + β1dit +Xitβ2 + it (2)
I proceed in two steps. First, I estimate equation 2 on the the extensive margin, by comparing229
winners of the contest with those that did not win. In this specification y˙it is the measure of230
growth for company i at time t, dit equals 1 if the firm wins a contract during the year t and 0231
otherwise, and Xit represents firm specific controls. I include as controls age and location of the232
firm, a vector of controls that account for geographic characteristics, and regional GDP indicators.233
All specifications control for time and region fixed effects.234
In the second step, I estimate the effect of demand shocks on the intensive margin. To measure235
the intensive margin, I estimate equation 2 defining dit to be the log of sales from menor cuantia.236
The coefficient β1 shows how percent changes in exogenous demand affect different measures of237
firm growth. To estimate if demand shocks have an effect beyond the year of the shocks, I look at238
growth at different time intervals, y˙it+i∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.15239
What does y˙it measure? During the year of the shock, y˙it shows the difference in growth240
between winners and losers, with t− 1 being the year of reference. A priori, one would expect241
to see significant differences in measures of growth between winners and losers. This is because242
winning an additional contract directly impacts balance sheet indicators such as sales and current243
14The probability of winning a contest is inversely proportional to the number of providers that qualified to the
contest.
15This is of particular importance given that the preferential procurement programs that create the demand
shocks have been presented as facilitating growth. For instance, an increase in cash flow due to additional demand
might alleviate budget or credit constraints. This might motivate firms to invest in capital or labor.
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asset during the year that the shock occurs. Nonetheless, it is still plausible to observe no differences244
between winners and runner-ups of the contest during the year of shock. For instance, if firms245
were capacity constrained, i.e. could only perform a limited number of contracts on a given year,246
then firms that win contracts from menor cuantia will not be able to perform additional work.247
Analogously, firms that did not win the contest, could seek work in the private sector. Under this248
scenario, firms replace private contracts with public ones, causing no overall changes in the total249
amount of work performed. It is worth noting, however, that the fact that firms apply to the250
menor cuantia contest suggests that they are not capacity constraint.16251
5 Results252
I begin this section by presenting the effects of demand shocks on growth, at the extensive margin253
during the year of the shock, shown in table 4. I estimate equation 2 by least squares, the254
independent variable winner takes the value 1 if a firm won a contest at time t and 0 otherwise.255
Each specification controls for time and region fixed-effects and clusters errors at the firm level.256
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is revenue growth. Firms that experienced a demand257
shock report, on average, approximately 22% higher revenues than firms that did not experience a258
shock. The coefficient of .202 is significant at the 1% level and is robust to the addition of controls.259
Columns 3 and 4 present the results for growth of wage expense. The estimated coefficients suggest260
that firms that win a contract spend, on average, 5% more on wages than non winners. These261
results, however, are not robust to the inclusion of additional controls. Columns 4 and 5 report the262
results on growth of fixed assets. Firms that win a contract report, on average, 7% higher fixed-263
assets than non-winners. Columns 7 and 8 report the results on current assets. The coefficients264
are significant at the 1% level and similar in magnitude to the coefficients estimated for growth of265
revenues.266
Overall the results from table 4 suggest that demand shocks affect firm growth in two distinct267
manners. For immediate measures of growth, such as revenues or current assets, there is a direct268
relationship between demand shocks and growth. To illustrate, given that the average yearly269
revenue of a firm for the sample is $269,230, the estimated coefficient on revenue suggests that270
winning a contest increases the measure by approximately $ 59,000 which is very close to the271
average value of a menor cuantia contract ($50,000). At the same time, the results show that for272
other measures of growth, such as wages and fixed assets, this relationship, while positive, has a273
16An additional explanation would be if firms could easily manipulate the balance sheet information, for instance
to avoid taxation, then this would account for the lack of changes observed.
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lower a magnitude and statistical significance.274
[Table 4 about here.]275
Next, I examine the effects of demand shocks on growth at the intensive margin. I estimate276
equation 2 by least squares, where the independent variable is the log of total yearly revenue277
received from menor cuantia. Table 5 presents the estimation results.278
[Table 5 about here.]279
Columns 1 and 2 show the results for revenue growth, suggesting that an increase of 10%280
in sales will increase declared revenue by 10%. While ostensibly trivial, this result provides a281
good indication that the financial statements used in this study are a reliable source to measure282
the financial performance of firms. Columns 3 and 4 present the results for the growth of wage283
expense. The estimated coefficient of 0.05 is significant at the 1% level and does not change with284
the addition of controls. This suggests that an increase of 10% in the demand will increase wage285
expenses by 5%. Columns 5 and 6 present the results on growth of fixed assets, the coefficients and286
suggest that an increase of 10% in the demand will increase wage expenses by 7%. The results,287
on fixed assets are only significant at the 10% level. Columns 7 and 8 report the results of current288
assets and suggest that an increase of 10% in the demand will increase wage expenses by 20%.289
Overall, the results from the intensive margin analysis are similar in magnitude and significance290
to the ones presented in table 4.291
Next, I examine the duration of the effects. This is of particular relevance given that the changes292
observed could be due to short-term reasons such as hiring more labor to fulfill the contract or293
renting machinery required for a project. Figure 2 shows the differences in growth rates between294
firms that won a menor cuantia contract and those that did not. The differences are shown for295
the first three years after the contest. The figure shows the coefficient for growth estimated using296
equation 2 with the 95% confidence interval. The dependent variable is the growth rate in gross297
revenues, wage expense, and fixed and current assets. The figure reveals two significant insights.298
First, the year after the shock, winners of the menor cuantia contest experience a decrease is gross299
revenues and current assets. The decrease the year after the shock is similar in magnitude than300
the increase experienced the year of the shock. No effect is observed the year after the shock for301
labor costs and fixed assets. Second, no effects in any measure of growth are observed two years302
after the shock.303
[Figure 2 about here.]304
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One non-pecuniary benefit of winning a contract is that it gives firms experience, reputation,305
and contacts in the procurement process. In this case, it is possible for winning firms to increase306
their sales to the government outside of the menor cuantia process. Table 6 provides the results307
of testing the difference in means of the the sales to the government between the winners and308
runner-ups. There are virtually no differences in sales to the government after the year of the309
shock.310
I perform several robustness checks (see appendix) to examine the sensitivity of the results.311
First, I estimate the results looking at each year individually. Second, I use an alternative defini-312
tions of growth. Third, I estimate the results defining the dependent variable in levels instead of313
growth. Fourth, I do a two stage estimation using the sales from menor cuantia as instrument for314
total yearly sales. The results are not affected by the use of these alternative specifications.315
[Table 6 about here.]316
6 Discussion and conclusions317
In this paper I estimate the causal effects of demand shocks, stemming from government procure-318
ment, on firm growth using as a source of exogenous variation the shocks from the menor cuantia319
process. I find that in the short-term, demand shocks significantly affect firm growth. Firms that320
win the contest report higher revenues and assets and spend more on wages and short-term assets321
than those that did not. The short-term results are consistent with recent findings in Hebous322
and Zimmermann (2016) and Ferraz et al. (2016). Contrary to their findings, however, there is323
no evidence of an increase in growth in the years following the shock. Similarly, no differences in324
additional sales to the government or the private sector are observed.325
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that government procurement has limited long-326
term impact on the growth of small firms. There are, however, important caveats concerning the327
generalization of these results. The short and aleatory nature of the menor cuantia process may328
affect how firms perceived the shock. Firms may be hesitant to invest in long-term assets or hire329
permanent workers if the change in demand is perceived as unsustainable or temporary. Similarly,330
the small amount and short duration of the projects might imply that firms can accommodate the331
increase in demand by hiring temporary staff. Further studies are needed to understand how the332
nature, magnitude, and duration of the demand shocks impact the long-term growth of SMEs.333
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A Robustness377
I perform several robustness checks to examine the sensitivity of the results. In table 7, I estimate378
the results looking at each year individually. In table 8, I estimate growth using an alternative379
definition of growth, yt−yt−1
.5∗(yt+yt−1) Ferraz et al. (2016). In table 9, I estimate the results defining the380
dependent variable in levels instead of growth. Finally, I do a two stage estimation using the sales381
from menor cuantia as instrument for total yearly sales (available upon request).382
[Table 7 about here.]383
[Table 8 about here.]384
[Table 9 about here.]385
B Random Assignment Tests386
In this section I perform several empirical tests to check the menor cuantia assignment mechanism.387
I start by constructing a theoretical distribution of the number of times that participants are388
expected to win a contest and compare this, using a χ2 test, with the realized distribution. It389
is important to note that the process involves both firms and individuals and as a result, I use390
all participants for this exercise. The construction of the theoretical distribution is based on the391
fact that the probability of winning a contest is inversely proportional to the number of qualified392
providers.393
For any contest j held at time t, let dkjt = i, i ∈ {1, 0} be an indicator variable taking value 1394
if the provider k wins the contest and 0 otherwise. For each individual contest j, the probability395
of winning is the inverse of the number of participants n that qualify to enter P (dj = 1) =
1
nj
. It396
follows that the expected value of the number of contracts, Dit = 1, of wins by a provider can be397
represented by:398
Ek[Di = 1] =
J∑
j
P (dj = 1)
where Ek[Di = 1] depends on two factors: the total number of contests J that a given provider399
participated in and the number of qualified providers participating in each contest. It is therefore400
possible to derive a theoretical distribution of the number of expected winnings by provider, and401
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test the theoretical results with the observed data. Let Xi be firm specific covariates, then:402
403
Proposition 1 The probability of winning a contest at time t is orthogonal to firm level characteristics404
Xi observed at time t− 1405
406
Proposition 2 The theoretical and actual frequency distributions of provider winnings are not different.407
408
Note also that the process implies that events should be independent of time. As a result, it409
is expected that winning a contest during t − 1 should not affect the probability of winning the410
contest at time t.411
Ek[Dit|Dit−1] = Ek[Dit] =
Jt∑
jt
P (dj = 1)
Proposition 3 Winning a contest during year t does not affect the probability of winning a contest during412
year k ∀t, k ∈ (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) where t 6= k413
414
Proposition 1 is tested and presented in the text. Proposition 2 is tested by using the χ2 test415
using the actual and theoretical distributions. The results are presented in table C.3 . For this, I416
use all of the contest won by all providers during the 2009-2012. I pooled the providers that won417
more than 12 times. This was done as the number of expected providers in each of those categories418
was less than five. I fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level.419
[Table 10 about here.]420
Proposition 3 is tested using a similar mechanism as in proposition 2 but only include those421
providers that qualified for a given contest in two given years. Results are presented in table C.3.422
I fail to reject the null hypothesis on all three cases at the 10% level.423
[Table 11 about here.]424
C Data Gathering Process425
In this section I describe the data gathering process for this project. A technical document de-426
scribing the programming scripts is available upon request.427
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The data gathering process was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted on obtaining428
detailed information on all the public purchases performed under the menor cuant´ıa processes for429
the years 2008-2012 in Ecuador. This provided information on each public purchase as well as430
all individuals and firms that submitted a bid to participate in each public work. The second431
phase of the project consisted on obtaining detailed information on each individual and firm that432
participated in the menor cuant´ıa process during the sample period. The third and final phase of433
the project, consisted on cleaning and entering this information into a database.434
C.1 Phase I435
The purpose of this phase was to obtain all public works done under the menor cuantia process436
for the years 2008-2012. To do this, I first downloaded a master file that contained all purchases437
done by public institutions in Ecuador for the years 2009-2015. The file was downloaded from the438
website of the public procurement agency (SERCOP)17439
This master file contained all purchases done by the government; including those done under440
processes other than the menor cuantia. Next, I selected the universe of all purchases under menor441
cuantia , which include their respective dates of publication. For each purchase, the file made442
available a description of the procurement process used, a purchase code, dates of the purchase,443
and other information. This file, however, did not provide the level of detail needed for the project.444
To obtain this additional information, a personalized data scrap code searched and downloaded all445
the meta-data. This required doing a personalized search for each public work in the sample. The446
gathering was restricted to the purchases which 1) were finalized 2) had a unique id number and447
3) were awarded to only one contractor. 28,957 out of the total 32,551 public works in the menor448
cuantia met this criteria and form the universe of public works for the project.449
The process above was done in three different batches during the year 2015. The first batch was450
a pilot project done in March 2015. The second batch took place between April and June 2015.451
The third batch was done in August 2015. For each of the 28,957 files, there were 9 pages that452
were downloaded: 1) basic information on the contract including length, terms of payment, and453
contacts, 2) information on the important dates of the public work, 3) information on the providers454
that had been invited, 4) information on the requirements for the public works, 5) information on455
the results of the contest, and 6) information on the providers that were qualified, 7) information456
17The website link is: http://portal.compraspublicas.gob.ec/serc op/analisis-sercop/. After opening the link, it is
necessary to click under “Reportes del Sistema de Contratacio´n Pu´blica” which will provide a login to the database.
Once inside the database, one can choose to download a report containing all information. This file was obtained
on February 15th, 2015
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on the products or services that were required, 8) a section for questions and answers, and 9) an457
archive with all files for the process.458
C.2 Phase II459
In phase II of the project, I obtained financial information on the firms and individuals that par-460
ticipated in the menor cuant´ıa process. The meta-data, gathered in the previous phase, provided461
information on all providers that submitted a bid to perform the public work. Each provider has462
a unique identification number used for tax purposes (RUC or registro u´nico del contribuyente).463
There are two different types of providers: firms and self-employed. By law, financial information464
for firms is available at the Superintendencia de Companias, (SUPERCIAS). SUPERCIAS is a465
government institution and all companies must provide financial records, tax statements, and con-466
tact information to them. SUPERCIAS makes this information publicly available through their467
website.468
Repeated requests to obtain the data on companies went unanswered. As a result, an automated469
program was created to obtain this information.18 I downloaded two types of data. The first470
included basic company information and was scrapped directly from the website. The second471
included all yearly financial statements on record for that company. The statements were stored as472
PDF documents in two different formats: 1) a scanned image and/or 2) a structured document. To473
obtain the financial data from the structured document, I ran several scripts to do so automatically.474
To obtain data from the scanned images, it was necessary to enter the information manually. For475
this, I adopted the help of several research assistants.476
C.3 Phase III477
In this phase of the project I had to enter the financial information into a database. Financial478
information after 2011 was available in a PDF format. The data from this file was extracted479
using an automated scripts. Figure 3 provides a sample of the balance. For balances that were480
scanned copies of documents, the data was entered manually and verified by at least an additional481
worker and was tested using accounting principles. Figure 4 and figure 5 provide an example of482
the financial information available as scanned documents.483
The final phase involved testing all information gathered to ensure it was consistent. First, to484
ensure that all public works were collected accurately, a manual check was done on 300 randomly485
18In order to minimize the risk of skipping some companies, I performed the scraping 3 times on those companies
I was not able to find.
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selected public works. A second check was ensuring that the costs indicated in the master file were486
consistent with the one indicated on each public work. Additionally, each public work was entered487
into a SQL database which ensured that public works were only entered once and that any major488
integrity problem was identified.489
[Figure 3 about here.]490
[Figure 4 about here.]491
[Figure 5 about here.]492
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Figure 1: Contract amount of public works under menor cuantia process: 2009-2012
The figure above provides the contract amount of the 5,475 public works in the sample performed between in the
menor cuantia process for the years 2009-2012. The values for public works are presented in US dollars.
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Figure 2: Growth following the years after winning a contract
The figure above contains average growth rates t + k, k ∈ (1, 2, 3) years after winning a contract under the menor cuantia process. Growth is
defined as the log differences. The bars represent the 95% confidence interval. The figure was created using the results from estimating equation
2 by least squares. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm won a contest at time t and 0 otherwise. Standard
errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level. Controls include age of the firm, the numbers of contests that a firm qualified for during
the year, the size of a firm, local GDP and construction permits issued during the year.
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Figure 3: Sample financial information
The figure above presents a financial return from a firm in the sample, available as a structured format. The data
from this balance can be obtained from an automated script.
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Figure 4: Sample financial information
The figure contains a financial return available as scanned copies. The data from this balance was obtained via-
manual entry.
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Figure 5: Sample financial information
The figure contains a financial return available as scanned copies. The data from this balance was obtained via-
manual entry.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of firms
2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Avg. age (years) 5.41 5.68 4.97 4.69 5.14
Avg. number of qualifications 2.16 6.76 5.68 4.67 5.41
Avg. number of winnings 0.52 0.88 0.82 0.77 0.80
Avg. yearly revenue (USD) 255,137 291,232 291,162 233,392 269,230
Avg. total assets(USD) 113,570 133,844 129,358 126,885 128,589
Avg. liabilities (USD) 90,084 105,213 100,211 91,743 98,202
Avg. wage expense (USD) 24,146 22,351 25,508 29,778 25,931
1 Descriptive statistics of 1,179 registered firms participating in the menor cuantia
process for the years in the sample. Values are arithmetic averages. Income, assets,
liabilities, and wage expense are presented in U.S. dollars. Assets (liabilities) include
fixed and current assets (liabilities).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of public works by year 2009-2012
2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Avg. contract amount (USD) 39,794 46,960 53,468 54,600 50,160
Avg. duration of contract (days) 57 63 69 65 65
Avg. days to submit a bid 8 7 7 7 7
Avg. number of qualified providers per contest 12 19 19 14 17
N. of contracts awarded 468 2034 1626 1347 5475
1 Descriptive statistics of the 5,475 public works used in this study by year of procurement. Values are
arithmetic averages of variables. Contract amount is measured in U.S. dollars. Length of contract is
measured in days.
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Table 3: Difference in means Student t-test results by year
Variable Runner Winner P value
2010
Log total assets (USD) 10.00 10.16 0.43
Log total liabilities (USD) 10.03 10.38 0.12
Log current assets (USD) 9.39 9.73 0.11
Log fixed assets (USD) 9.43 9.71 0.20
Log current liabilites (USD) 9.64 10.05 0.13
Log fixed liabilites (USD) 10.38 10.35 0.92
Log revenue (USD) 11.66 11.70 0.82
Log wage expenditure (USD) 9.19 9.49 0.14
Firm age (years) 5.57 5.82 0.60
2011
Log total assets (USD) 10.17 9.76 0.12
Log total liabilities (USD) 10.25 9.93 0.14
Log current assets (USD) 9.69 9.38 0.14
Log fixed assets (USD) 9.55 9.44 0.59
Log current liabilites (USD) 9.98 9.66 0.12
Log fixed liabilites (USD) 10.23 10.02 0.54
Log revenue (USD) 11.46 11.42 0.85
Log wage expenditure (USD) 9.24 9.00 0.13
Firm age (years) 5.22 4.70 0.25
2012
Log total assets (USD) 9.57 9.61 0.83
Log total liabilities (USD) 9.97 9.81 0.46
Log current assets (USD) 9.15 9.22 0.72
Log fixed assets (USD) 9.67 9.45 0.29
Log current liabilites (USD) 9.72 9.46 0.24
Log fixed liabilites (USD) 9.64 9.92 0.42
Log revenue (USD) 11.13 11.23 0.70
Log wage expenditure (USD) 9.37 9.29 0.59
Firm age (years) 4.86 4.51 0.43
1 The following table presents the results from a t-test difference in
means exercise for the firms participating in the menor cuantia con-
test. The term “winners” refer to the firms that won in the menor
cuantia process whereas the term “runner” denotes the firms that
did not win. The variables are the lags of the log values.
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Table 4: Effect of demand shocks on firm growth: extensive margin
Dependent Variable Revenue Growth Wage Growth Fixed Assets Growth Current Assets Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Winner 0.245∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.048∗ 0.043 0.081∗∗ 0.068∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.064) (0.029) (0.028) (0.037) (0.038) (0.068) (0.071)
Age of Firm -0.016 0.004 -0.001 -0.076∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013)
Contests participated 0.005∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size of firm No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1778 1771 1778 1771 1778 1771 1778 1771
R2 0.014 0.023 0.025 0.044 0.005 0.013 0.029 0.050
1 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth. The dependent variables
is growth (log differences) of: revenue (columns 1 and 2), wage expense (columns 3 and 4), fixed assets (columns 5
and 6), and current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm
won a contest at time t and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level. Age of a
firm is reported in years. Contest participated refers to the numbers of contests that a firm qualified for during the
year. The size of a firm are a set of dummies that control for the size (as defined by the bureau of companies of
Ecuador) of the firm. The regional controls include: local GDP and construction permits issued during the year. P
values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01
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Table 5: Effect of demand shocks on firm growth: intensive margin
Dependent Variable Revenue Growth Wage Growth Fixed Assets Growth Current Assets Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Revenue from Menor Cuantia 0.11∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Age of firm -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Contests participated 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size of firm No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380
R2 0.017 0.025 0.029 0.058 0.006 0.012 0.050 0.060
1 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth. The dependent variables are the
growth (log differences) of revenue (columns 1 and 2), wage expense (columns 3 and 4), fixed assets (columns 5 and 6),
and current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable revenue from Menor Cuantia is the log of revenues obtained from the
menor cuantia contest. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level. Age of a firm is reported in years.
Contest participated refers to the numbers of contests that a firm qualified for during the year. The size of a firm are a set
of dummies that control for the size (as defined by the bureau of companies of Ecuador) of the firm. The regional controls
include: local GDP and construction permits issued during the year. P values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01
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Table 6: Average difference in government sales between winners
and runner-ups of the menor cuantia contest
Sales-Winners Sales-Runner-Ups Difference P-Value Year
Year of schock
43659.34 120620 -76960.66 0.008343 2009
140253.7 268325 -128071.3 0.064538 2010
121272.9 203820.3 -82547.4 0.013566 2011
153569.6 250319.2 -96749.6 0.12826 2012
1 Year after schock
188835 230421.6 -41586.6 0.686347 2009
192870 226931.3 -34061.3 0.516806 2010
352894.1 407545.5 -54651.4 0.657602 2011
191365 270290.3 -78925.3 0.196067 2012
2 Years after schock
187444.5 238895.5 -51451 0.466527 2009
432706.2 493418 -60711.8 0.708223 2010
233369.1 328853.3 -95484.2 0.174268 2011
1 The following table presents the results from a t-test difference in
means. The term “Sales-Winners” and “Sales-Runner-Ups” refer to
all government sales outside of the menor cuantia process for firms
that won and lost in the menor cuantia process, respectively. The
column “Difference” denotes the differences in sales etween winners
and runner-ups. The column “P-value” denotes the significance level.
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Table 7: Regression results by year
Dependent Variable Revenue Growth Wage Growth Fixed Assets Growth Current Assets Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Results for 2010
Winner 0.640∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.101 0.103 0.354∗∗ 0.353∗∗ 0.373∗∗ 0.349∗∗
(0.186) (0.189) (0.111) (0.112) (0.137) (0.145) (0.165) (0.164)
Age of firm -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 272 272 227 227 275 275 409 409
R2 0.042 0.070 0.004 0.017 0.025 0.043 0.012 0.065
Results for 2011
Winner 0.490∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.242∗∗ -0.024 -0.005 0.306∗ 0.292∗
(0.199) (0.202) (0.123) (0.121) (0.135) (0.133) (0.161) (0.162)
Age of firm -0.000 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 301 301 244 244 280 280 433 433
R2 0.019 0.044 0.017 0.062 0.019 0.048 0.008 0.017
Results for 2012
Winner 0.363 0.249 -0.123 -0.100 0.185 0.208 0.382∗∗ 0.353∗∗
(0.263) (0.257) (0.106) (0.104) (0.150) (0.163) (0.168) (0.171)
Age of firm -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 282 282 237 237 244 244 436 436
R2 0.007 0.042 0.006 0.071 0.008 0.016 0.012 0.027
1 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth, by year. The dependent variables is
the growth (log differences) of: revenue (columns 1 and 2), wage expense (columns 3 and 4), fixed assets (columns 5 and 6), and
current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm won a contest at time
t and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level. Age of a firm is reported in years. Contest
participated refers to the numbers of contests that a firm qualified for during the year. The size of a firm are a set of dummies
that control for the size (as defined by the bureau of companies of Ecuador) of the firm. The regional controls include: local
GDP and construction permits issued during the year. P values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01
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Table 8: Regression results alternative growth definition
Dependent Variable Revenue Growth Wage Growth Fixed Assets Growth Current Assets Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Winner 0.249∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.102∗ 0.079 0.154∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.071) (0.061) (0.059) (0.065) (0.065) (0.055) (0.055)
Age of firm -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1039 1039 899 899 870 870 1262 1262
R2 0.012 0.064 0.003 0.058 0.033 0.041 0.016 0.047
Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth. The dependent variables is the growth,
defined as ( yt−yt−1.5∗(yt+yt−1) ) of: revenue (columns 1 and 2), wage expense (columns 3 and 4), fixed assets (columns 5 and 6), and
current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm won a contest at time
t and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level. Age of a firm is reported in years. P values
∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01
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Table 9: Regression results, levels
Dependent Variable Gross Revenues Wage Expense Fixed Assets Current Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Winner 1.443∗∗∗ 1.337∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗ 0.315 0.272 0.573∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗
(0.244) (0.228) (0.216) (0.200) (0.239) (0.221) (0.171) (0.153)
Age of firm 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1778 1771 1778 1771 1778 1771 1778 1771
R2 0.020 0.149 0.011 0.146 0.001 0.185 0.006 0.196
Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth. The dependent variables is are the
log dollar amount (as reported in the balance sheet) of revenues (columns 1 and 2), wage expense (columns 3 and 4), fixed
assets (columns 5 and 6), and current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if
a firm won a contest at time t and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level. Age of a firm is
reported in years. P values ∗p < .1, ∗ ∗ p < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01
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Table 10: Realized vs. expected frequency distributions
Contracts won Expected Actual
0 2186 2173
1 1966 1955
2 872 888
3 423 477
4 272 271
5 154 155
6 105 118
7 73 66
8 40 52
9 25 27
10 21 24
11 16 19
12 12 6
+13 25 34
Pearson χ2 Pr= .242
1 The following table presents the results of a χ2 difference in distribution test between
the theoretical and actual number of times providers in the menor cuantia process were
expected to win contracts. The derivation of the theoretical distribution is presented
in proposition 2.
34
Table 11: Expected vs. Actual distribution
Year Expected vs Actual
2010
2009 Winner Loser
Winner 979-958 261-282
Runner-up 650-619 393-424
Pearson χ2 Pr= .396
2011
2010 Winner Loser
Winner 2157-2151 630-636
Runner-up 447-468 535-514
Pearson χ2 Pr= .816
2012
2011 Winner Loser
Winner 1817-1874 511-454
Runner-up 438-461 350-327
Pearson χ2 Pr= .132
1 The following table presents the results of a χ2 difference in distribution test between
the theoretical and actual number of times providers in the menor cuantia process were
expected to win contracts. The test look at individuals that qualified for a random
contest during they years 2009 and 2010, 2010 and 2011, and 2011 and 2012. The
derivation of the theoretical distribution is presented in proposition 3.
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